Dean Hatch says he won’t hold his breath waiting for the First Circuit Court of Appeals to force US District Court Judge Richard G. Stearns to recuse himself from presiding over Whitey Bulger’s trial.
“The judges up there know each other,” Hatch said, sitting in his house in Western Massachusetts. “They’re friends. They don’t like to embarrass each other.”
Comments
This column falls well short of publishable quality in at least two ways.
First, what in the world does Dean Hatch's unsuccessful appeal of his unsuccessful lawsuit have to do with the conflict of interest alleged in the Bulger case, or any conflict of interest anywhere? Answer: nothing. It's just irrelevant and inflammatory, i.e., Hatch "accused Stearns of misinterpreting the law so that a jury was forced to rule against him." That just means he lost his case and his appeal. That actually happens a lot. It is wrong to imply bias, as the writer has done, without specific evidence of such. Who does Mr. Cullen think should hear appeals, if not the Appeals Court?
Second, even in the context of the immediate allegation, the charge being made is comical. Bulger claims that a now-dead prosecutor told him he could kill people. First of all, even if that were true, it would be an illegal conspiracy. You can't have a legal agreement to commit or permit murder. That's where the whole idiotic story should end. And even if true, there is no allegagion that Stearns has any particular reason to dishonor a real agreement. Why can't I just say, next time I am in court, that the same dead prosecutor told me I could commit my crime? That would be enough to toss 8 of the 11 federal judges in my case, too, if Cullen's logic is valid.
But it's not valid. It is sloppy and shows way more bias than does any evidence against this judge.
It is not good that the Justice Department has stonewalled the public in investigating and admitted the corruption that affected the agency's relationship with Bulger. But that is no reason to stretch the truth now to help Bulger evade justice. Mr. Cullen wrote a column for decades, and probably knew a lot about Bulger from his South Boston sources that he never put into his columns. Maybe Mr. Cullen, under his own logic, should recuse himself from writing about Bulger until after the trial is over.
I usually like your columns, but this one has real issues. The Hatch case has zero to do with the Bulger case. You include it only to smear Judge Stearns. He may indeed not be the judge for Bulger, because of the potential conflict of interest from his government service, but that argument should stand and fall on its own merits. It shouldn't be sensationalized by implying that Stearns is a bad guy because he ruled against a man who was seriously injured and that the first Circuit Court of Appeals judges just protected "their own" by not reversing Stearns opinion. So what if the man's lawyers felt they were right on the law. In most cases both sides have lawyers who think they are right, but obviously the cases only go in favor of one side. Circuit Court judges also reverse District judges fairly frequently.
Again - the Bulger argument can and should stand on its own. Bringing in Dean Hatch only inflames passions while being irrelevant to the main argument.
Let's then proceed with this multi-million dollar investigation and trial, only to have it overturned for just the reason Mr. Carney is arguing at the outset. And if a change of venue is called for--or the assignment of this case to a judge outside the circuit is prudent--then do it. This entire opus of corruption, starring both the government and vicious criminals, must be concluded in the cleanest and most unimpeachable manner. One can see now that Mr. Carney will simply call Justice Stearns to the witness stand . . . and "let the games begin!"
Quincy Adams, with monicker like, I hope you will be able to tell us the standard under which such an appeal would be considered, and what, if anything, we know or even suspect that would make the success of such an appeal a realistic possibility.
Otherwise, I think you'll agree that any zany motion by a defense counsel who has no other options is by itself an insufficient basis to disrupt and -- perhaps most importantly to this particular defendant -- delay the trial.
I hope Whitey lives long enough for trial!
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A writer looking around to produce a story that attracts attention while under pressure to meet a deadline is not something I would want to do. Another boring Bulger story would probably be read only by hard core followers of the case in addition to a few Southie people in Boston and scattered around the state. Finding someone for the basis of a story, who is bitter after losing from a decision by Judge Stearns, is a novel approach and attracts attention I guess. The logic I see in this story is: defense lawyers should not be appointed as judges, and prosecuters should not be appointed as judges. Each would bring their biases to the bench. That leaves part-time real estate contract lawyers like Scott Brown available for appointments to the bench. Now there's a story!
“The judges up there know each other,” Hatch said, sitting in his house in Western Massachusetts. “They’re friends. They don’t like to embarrass each other.” Accurate statement and as noted below a new and different venue should be sought. Interesting when the victims file suit the only Circuit Judge that saw and spoke reality was from Puerto Rico. TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge, concerning the denial of en banc review. Some cases are of "exceptional importance" Nos.09-1950 10-1766 09-1951 09-1952 Donahue v. United States Entered: October 6, 2011 Close because of the potential they have to affect the lives of millions of people. See, e.g., Igartúa, et al. v. United States, No. 09-2186, __F.3d __, 2011 WL 3340120, *2 (1st Cir. Aug. 4, 2011) (Torruella, J., dissenting). Other cases are of exceptional importance because of the light they cast on our public institutions. The latter, while not always directly affecting as broad a segment of the population, are nevertheless exceptionally important by virtue of what they demonstrate about the trust that we -- for better or worse -- place in those institutions. This is one of those cases. Yet barely a month since a divided vote in Igartúa denied 4 million United States citizens residing in Puerto Rico review of constitutional issues of exceptional importance, this court continues this noxious pattern and once again prevents consideration by the full court of questions of exceptional importance. By this action it allows the government's outrageous conduct to remain free of any consequence, and as in Igartúa, perpetrates a monstrous injustice on another, albeit smaller, but no less worthy, group of hapless citizens. Is it so unreasonable for citizens to rely on what their government was repeatedly asserting as the truth? Can the government be allowed to benefit from its own perfidious conduct in duping its own citizens with stonewalling and outright lies? Are citizens to be held to such a standard of cynicism in their dealings with government, especially with such hallowed agencies as the FBI? Taken individually, these concerns -- individual injustice, loss of public trust, and substantial legal error -- might not by themselves justify en banc review. Taken together, I believe they do. Two hundred and thirty-five years after we rid ourselves of King George III and his despotic ascendancy over colonial America, we cling to a doctrine that was originally based on the Medieval notion that "the King can do no wrong." This maxim was blindly accepted into American law under the assumption that it was incorporated as part of the common law in existence when our Nation separated from England. See Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 645 n.28 (1980). However, this assumption does not withstand historical scrutiny. See Edwin M. Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort (pt. VI), 36 Yale L. J. 1, 17-41 (1926). Furthermore, the present case is the quintessential example of the fact that at times the government can, and does, do wrong. The Donahue and Halloran cases are an unfortunate but vivid example that even in the United States, with all our legal and constitutional safeguards, the government can go rogue. Although it is my belief and hope that our system is normally self-corrective, there are times when the courts have a duty to intervene to keep our system within the bounds of decency. The moral of this outcome seems to be that crime does pay, at least for the government. This case cries for redress, either by the Supreme Court, or by a special bill of Congress. Change of venue in order to ensure public confidence is not only called for it is the essence of law and unquestionably called for because of "appearance to the public"; clearly the goal is to drag this on and on until Bulger is dead and the government employees still alive escape exposure. The federal court system in Massachusetts is a mini mob family where these tax paid public servants from the clerks office to the circuit executive office aid and abet each other in the commission of federal crimes and also aid and abet certain "elite" attorneys escape consequence for not only criminal federal law violations but straight up unquestionable "fraud upon the court". The current primary example of bias in this court when it comes to one of their own in need of protection for willful violation of rights and purposeful violation of federal law is the reappointment of the CORRUPT Magistrate Judge Leo T. Sorokin. http://www.scribd.com/tired_of_corruption Time and time again the federal court system in Massachusetts proves that rule of law is not top priority but that the will of the corrupt is the basis of decisions made!!!
if you exclude all former prosecutors, should you exclude all for defense attorneys-- who is left ?