An interesting and fairly well-done article dealing with a topic obscure to most layfolks. There are a couple of elements that Ms. Kayyem fails to mention, however. One is the influence of China in this question of oceanic shipping, i.e. for vessels of a China-owned company known as COSCO. This company's weekly ship calls are a huge part of the Port of Boston's business growth and are credited with preserving thousands of local jobs associated with the comings and goings of the Chinese-owned vessels. A second question tied to Ms. Kayyem's article relates to the survival of Boston's commercial shipping port if, as she suggests, most transworld vessels eventually double the size of current postpanamax ships. These two points are, of course, interrelated. With the consortium of Asian shipping companies functioning as COSCO, there is a direct Asia-East Coast U.S. service. But if COSCO ups the size of its ships to the maximum able to cross the expanded Panama Canal, what sort of vessels will carry the Asian cargoes to and from Boston? Some sort of smaller container ships or barges? And where will cargo container transfers take place? Will there be some sort of new American-based marine cargo service created, and will that have an implication for American seamen, whose ranks have been decimated since the 1960s? Lastly, how will the size increases of vessels sailing the Pacific relate to sizes of ships carrying cargo containers to and from northern and southern Europe. Crurently Mediterranean Shipping Co. (MSC) calls twice a week at Boston, one ship with cargoes from England, Germany, Scandinavia, etc., the other from southern European nations such as Italy, Spain and other counties in Africa.

The typical 13,000 TEU containership (Hyundai Heavy Industries Hull Series 2150 for example) has a draught of 15.5 m (51 feet) and length over all of 366m (1200 ft) making it too large for Boston Harbor. Even if the millions could be found found to dredge the harbor the existence of the various tunnels would seriously hamper any efforts. As an FYI, the Ports of NY and NJ are spending in excess of US $ 1.0 Billion on raising one bridge. The Port of Boston neither originates, nor exports sufficient freight to make this an economical venture. Additionally given the MBTA's inability to acquire desperately needed cars for the commuter rail, it seems ludicrous to consider that Massport could find the funds to replace the current container cranes and geological engineering that would be required on the landside. And finally where do the containers go once they get here? With no on terminal rail facilities, all containers would have to come and go via the Southeast Expressway. Strictly speaking, Post Panamax container vessels have been in service since 1987 when APL introduced the first vessels of the genre. These are vessels that are 4750 TEU and greater. The largest Panamax containerships, US Line's New York class vessels designed by Charles Cushing topped out at 4450 TEU. There has been this growing fantasy by port authorities along the US East Coast that the expanded Panama Canal will be a windfall. The picture is not so clear. For the past ten years the liner companies have been on a buying spree buying ships in the 8,000 to 13,000 TEU size range. The problem is that to introduce a new ship size, one needs to do it in batches of 8-10 vessels. These ships travel in great circles between Asia and Europe, or Asia and North America. To provide service on a schedule more frequent than once every two months (roundtrip between Asia and the US), multiple ships are needed so that each port on the rotation is called by a vessel once a week. The upshot is more vessel capacity than freight. One needs to look at the part existing canal played in world freight movement. It allowed an economical around the world service. A ship could start in Asia, then to USWC, through the canal to USEC and then to Europe and then via the Med and the Suez Asia again. ALong the way it would drop off freight and pick up freight. The notion of a round the world service no longer holds water as the bulk of finished goods freight originates in Asia. For the past decade the US' single largest export containerized commodity has been air (empty containers). The US imports twice as many loaded containers as it exports. In other words fifty percent of all US export container shipments are empties. The trend is similar in Europe, but not so drastic. Without balanced traffic from the US and Europe, a round the world service is not feasible. The major trade lanes are Asia to US and Asia to Europe. For the new canal to be successful, the cost to ship from Asia to the USEC must be cheaper. Here is the kicker, the existing intermodal land bridge is bay far the least expensive method of moving freight in fuel consumption terms. Think of it this way, under the current plan when a ship turns to Asia after a USWC rotation it is on average half empty. Empties do not generate revenue. If we suppose NY/NJ is the turning port for a call via the new canal, vessels leaving New York would not only have to transit the Pacific half empty, but a significant time in the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico. The new canal might be of value should there be turmoil in the Middle East that blocked the Suez. However, Maersk has been working for the past five years on a joint venture with the Russian rails and has demonstrated containerized freight can be diverted to Eastern Russia loaded on railcars and railed to Western Europe cheaper than using the alternative water routes. Perhaps the article should have been titled; "If they build it, will they come?

Airplanes, buses, subway cars and public arenas and stadiums of all sorts also confront a future of having to accomodate wider loads.  Lay off the McRibs, eat salads and hit the gym, people, the balloon butt is not sexy.