It remains one of Wall Street’s most puzzling mysteries: What exactly did JPMorgan Chase bankers know about Bernard L. Madoff’s Ponzi scheme?
A new government document explains why — five years after Madoff’s arrest spotlighted his ties to JPMorgan and later led the bank to pay $2 billion for turning a blind eye to his fraud — the picture is still so clouded.
The previously unreported document, obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request, reveals a behind-the-scenes dispute that tested the limits of JPMorgan’s legal rights and raised alarming yet unsubstantiated accusations of perjury at the bank. More broadly, the document highlights the legal hurdles federal authorities can face when investigating a Wall Street giant.
That dispute, which positioned JPMorgan against the government and ultimately one government agency against another, traced to the point after Madoff’s arrest in December 2008. Around that time, JPMorgan’s lawyers interviewed dozens of bank employees who potentially crossed paths with Madoff’s company.
Federal regulators at the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency sought copies of the lawyers’ interview notes, the government document and other records show, hoping they would open a window into the bank’s actions. The issue gained urgency in 2012, according to the records, when the comptroller’s office conducted its own interviews with JPMorgan employees and discovered a “pattern of forgetfulness.”
Suspicious that the memory lapses were feigned, the regulators renewed their request for the interview notes held by JPMorgan’s lawyers.
But JPMorgan, which produced other materials and made witnesses available to the comptroller’s office, declined to share those notes. In its denial, the bank cited confidentiality requirements like the attorney-client privilege, a legal protection that essentially prevents an outsider from gaining access to private communications between a lawyer and a client.
Even after the comptroller’s office referred the issue to the Treasury Department’s inspector general, which sided with the regulator, the fight dragged on for months. Invoking a rare exception to attorney-client privilege, the inspector general argued that the lawyers’ interviews were essentially “made for the purpose of getting advice for the commission of a fraud or crime.”
If the accusations were true, JPMorgan employees either duped lawyers into covering up wrongdoing, or, worse, the lawyers themselves helped obstruct the investigation.
The accusation, the government document showed, led to a debate in Washington over how far to press JPMorgan when the bank was sure to fight and a judge would be free to set a harmful precedent for future cases.
Those concerns, and skepticism about the Treasury’s inspector general’s accusations, drove the Justice Department to reject the move to revoke attorney-client privilege.
Federal authorities worry that Wall Street might take the privilege too far — particularly in an era when banks facing a torrent of federal scrutiny are hiringlaw firms to conduct internal investigations alongside the government.
As those investigations proceed, banks have invoked a number of protective firewalls, including attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine, which shields interview notes and other documents that bank lawyers drafted in anticipation of litigation.
“Why hire a lawyer to do an internal investigation? It’s because you get the privileges,” said Bruce A. Green, a former federal prosecutor who is now professor at Fordham Law School. , where he directs the Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics. “Otherwise, you’d save a little money and hire a consultant or accountant.”